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Abstract
This special perspectives section features commentary on the implications of the Srebrenica massacre for U.S.
foreign policy. Given the 20-year anniversary of the massacre, we felt that it was appropriate to invite a range of
scholars to participate in a forum to address different aspects of the tragedy and its aftermath in the context of
U.S. foreign policy. The forum is structured around a commentary by David Gibbs, author of First Do No
Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Vanderbilt University Press, 2009.
Gibbs article, "How the Srebrenica Massacre Redefined U.S. Foreign Policy," is featured below. Within the
next month, we will have responses to Gibbs' argument from several experts on the subject, followed by a
closing commentary by Gibbs.
As this article goes to press, a new development has emerged: “The Obama administration is moving to
designate the Islamic State’s murderous attacks on the Yazidi in Iraq an act of ‘genocide,’” according to a press
report. It should be recalled that last year, the regime of Bashir Assad was widely believed to be committing
genocide in Syria, and in 2011, Muammar Gaddafi was at least planning a genocide in Libya. And in all of
these cases, the claims of genocide were widely accompanied by calls for US and NATO intervention, as a
solution. While readers will rightly deplore the atrocities that attended these events, the word “genocide” is
being used with notable regularity, in a way that already has and will continue to erode the meaning of this
very important concept, through overuse. --Ronald W. Cox
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The mass killing of some 8,000 people in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica, in July 1995, 
has achieved iconic status, as one of the most recognized atrocities in history. The massacre 
should also be remembered as an event that helped recast the whole idea of military intervention: 
Prior to the Cold War, the concept was viewed with suspicion as a consummate act of realpolitik. 
Since Srebrenica, interventionism has been viewed with far greater legitimacy, as an altruistic act 
of genocide prevention. Within the US and Europe, the Srebrenica massacre galvanized a whole 
generation of political activists around the idea of humanitarian intervention.  
Perhaps most importantly, the massacre helped give a new impetus to US hegemony, 
contributing to its post-Cold War legitimacy. In bolstering America’s hegemonic position, the 
significance of the Srebrenica massacre cannot be overstated: The massacre helped trigger a 
NATO bombing campaign that is widely credited with ending the Bosnian war, along with the 
associated atrocities, and this campaign gave NATO a new purpose for the post-Soviet era. Since 
that time, the Srebrenica precedent has been continuously invoked as a justification for military 
force. The perceived need to prevent massacres and oppression helped justify later interventions 
in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, as well as the ongoing fight against ISIS. The recent 
UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which contains a strongly interventionist tone, was 
inspired in part by the memory of Srebrenica.  
Supporters of military intervention often point to the historical lessons of Srebrenica, the 
most important of which is the need to use decisive military force as a response to humanitarian 
emergencies, while dispensing with diplomacy. This position was succinctly stated in a 2006 
New Republic editorial: “In the response to most foreign policy crises, the use of military force is 
properly viewed as a last resort. In the response to genocide, the use of military force is properly 
viewed as a first resort.” 1 Given the broad way that genocide is now defined, this is a call for 
interventions without limit.  
US interventions carried out after Srebrenica are increasingly presented as humanitarian 
activities. In 2005, Christopher Hitchens defended the US decision to invade Iraq, with an article 
entitled “From Srebrenica to Baghdad.”2 In 2011, when Guardian columnist Peter Preston 
advocated military intervention in Libya, he began with the words: “Remember Srebrenica?”3 In 
2012, a CNN call for Western intervention in Syria appeared under the title “Syria, Sarajevo, and 
Srebrenica.”4 A 2014 article on ISIS advances in Syria warned of a possible new “New 
Srebrenica,”5 with the implication that Western military action was needed to prevent this 
calamity. The massacre has become a handy justification for nearly all interventions, and it was 
the issue of genocide that infused Srebrenica with its potency.  
I will argue that the conventional wisdom about Srebrenica is mistaken. Contrary to 
popular belief, the NATO interventions in Bosnia actually worsened the atrocities they were 
intended to resolve. There is also abundant evidence that diplomacy might have prevented the 
Bosnian war and thus prevented the Srebrenica massacre, but this option was blocked by pro-
                                                 
1 “Again,” New Republic, May 15, 2006. Emphasis added. 
2 Christopher Hitchens, “From Srebrenica to Baghdad: What the Genocide Taught Us about Intervention,” Salon, 
July 11, 2005, slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2005/07/from_srebrenica_to_baghdad.html. 
3 Peter Preston, “Remember Srebrenica? The West’s Intervention in Libya is a No-Brainer,” Guardian, May 29, 
2011, theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/29/srebrenica-libya-intervention-no-brainer. 
4 Tim Lister, “Syria, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica: When Outrage Isn’t Enough,” CNN, May 30, 2012, 
cnn.com/2012/05/29/world/meast/syria-sarajevo-and-srebrenica/. 
5 “The Last Days of Kobani: A Decisive Battle in the Fight against Islamic State,” Speigel Online International, 
October 13, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/kobani-battle-against-islamic-state-reveals-west-
turkey-shortcomings-a-996809.html. 
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interventionist forces in the United States, which demanded a military option instead. The lesson 
that the foreign policy establishment has learned – on the need for more not less US intervention 
– is the wrong lesson. 
 
The Facts of the Srebrenica Massacre 
 
The massacre took place near the end of the 1992-1995 Bosnian war, which resulted from 
the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation in the early 1990s.6 The Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was composed of three main ethnic groups, Bosnian Muslims, with approximately 
44 percent of the population, Serbs with 31 percent, and Croats with 17 percent. The Muslims’ 
political party won the country’s first presidential election and a Muslim, Alija Izetbegović, 
became the new state’s first president. Izetbegović established a political alliance between the 
Muslim and Croat groups, and this alliance formed the basis of the new state. The ethnic Serbs 
feared that the Muslim-Croat dominance in Bosnia would be directed against their interests, and 
these fears set the stage for war. When Bosnia officially became independent in April 1992, the 
Serb regions seceded from Bosnia; with their superior weapons and training, the Serb militias 
undertook an offensive campaign to expand their landholdings, by driving out members of other 
ethnic groups, especially the Muslims. Stated simply, the Serbs engaged in mass ethnic 
cleansing, which was accompanied by massacres, rapes, and other crimes. Of the three ethnic 
groups, it is clear that the Muslims suffered the most, accounting for 70 percent of the total 
civilian deaths; while the Serbs accounted for 20 percent, according to recent estimates.7 
 Beginning in 1992, the Serb military besieged Srebrenica, while the mostly Muslim 
inhabitants of the town were defended by Bosnian government forces, along with a small United 
Nations peacekeeping contingent. Then in early July 1995, Serb forces attacked Srebrenica at a 
time when the Muslims had removed the main body of their defense forces. The Serb attackers 
encountered little resistance, and they easily overran Srebrenica. The horrific events that 
followed Serb conquest have been well documented: The Serbs first expelled the town’s women 
and children, while they rounded up military-age males. Over a period of several days, the Serbs 
executed some 8,000 people, overwhelmingly males sixteen and older. While the Bosnian war 
entailed numerous massacres and atrocities (with most of them committed by the Serbs), none 
approached the scale of Srebrenica, which was surely the largest mass killing in Europe since the 
1940s. According to an investigation of Srebrenica authorized by the Dutch government: “In 
some places the Muslims were slaughtered like beasts.”8 
At the level of responsibility: The killings in Srebrenica were largely orchestrated by 
Bosnian Serb military commanders, notably Generals Radislav Krstić and Ratko Mladić; as well 
                                                 
6 Regarding the background to Yugoslavia’s collapse and the Bosnia war, see: Susan L. Woodward, Balkan 
Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken 
Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition. Boulder: Westview, 1995; and Steven L. 
Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. Armonk, 
NY: M. E. Sharp, 1999. 
7 Jan Zwierzchowski and Ewa Tabeau, “The 1992-95 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Census-Based Multiple 
System Estimation of Causalities’ Undercount,” Conference Paper for the International Research Workshop on ‘The 
Global Costs of Conflict,’ The Households in Conflict Network (HiCN), and The German Institute for Economic 
Research (DIW Berlin), February 1-2, 2010, Berlin, p. 17,  
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/War_Demographics/en/bih_casualty_undercount_conf_paper_100201.pdf. 
8 Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Srebrenica – A “Safe” Area: Reconstruction, Background, 
Consequences, and Analyses of the Fall of a Safe Area, 2003, Summary for the Press, 
http://www.niod.knaw.nl/en/srebrenica-report/summary-press. 
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as the Serbs’ political leader, Radovan Karadžić, all of whom have either been convicted or are 
currently being tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 
the Hague.9 The Republic of Serbia and its unsavory president Slobodan Milošević bore some 
responsibility as well, for having supported Bosnian Serb militias throughout the war. The 
battalion of UN peacekeepers in Srebrenica took no action to defend the town, and they have 
often been blamed for the massacre. While the UN soldiers hardly distinguished themselves with 
heroism, these lightly armed peacekeepers could not realistically have repelled the much larger 
Serb forces. The frequent scapegoating of the United Nations seems unjustified.  
While Serb forces must bear the overwhelming burden of guilt for the massacre, the 
Bosnian government also contributed to the tragedy. The widespread view that the Muslim-led 
government was comprised of innocents has little to do with reality. On the contrary, Bosnian 
officials deliberately allowed Srebrenica to fall to the Serbs, according to Swedish diplomat Carl 
Bildt, who served as the European Union mediator during the Bosnian war. Bildt noted in his 
memoirs that Bosnian government forces assigned to protect Srebrenica were “not putting up any 
resistance. Later it was revealed that they had been ordered by the Sarajevo commanders not to 
defend Srebrenica.”10  
Bildt’s account is supported by Tim Ripley, who covered the Balkans for the highly 
regarded Jane’s series of defense publications. Ripley provides copious evidence that the 
Bosnian government allowed the town to fall: 
 
British, Dutch, and other [UN] personnel and many veterans of the Sarajevo press corps, 
including [Martin] Bell of the BBC, and Nick Gowing of the Channel Four television 
network all came to the conclusion that the Bosnian government decided to let Srebrenica 
fall to increase the pressure on the international community to intervene against the 
Serbs... A month before [the Serb attack], Sarajevo had ordered the charismatic local 
Bosnia military commander... to leave for no apparent reason. He was then prevented 
from returning. As the situation worsened, the Sarajevo leadership made no effort to 
launch diversionary attacks... Dutch peacekeepers near Tuzla told Gowing that they saw 
Bosnian troops escaping from Srebrenica... carrying brand new anti-tank weapons, still in 
their plastic wrappings... [British UN peacekeeper Lieutenant-Colonel Jim] Baxter said 
“they [the Bosnian government] knew what was happening in Srebrenica. I am certain 
they decided it was worth the sacrifice.”11 
 
The Bosnian government was adopting an overall strategy of exposing its civilians to Serb 
attacks, so as to shock world opinion into intervening against the Serbs, as described at length by 
Ripley, who concludes: “To Western military men in Sarajevo, the Bosnian strategy of using 
children, old people, and other civilians as ‘staked goats’ to generate international sympathy was 
abhorrent.”12 It would seem likely that these Machiavellian methods contributed to the fall of 
Srebrenica, and at least indirectly to the massacre that followed.  
Serb nationalists have long claimed that the Muslim commander at Srebrenica Brigadier 
Naser Orić had repeatedly staged attacks against Serb villages in the area and thus provoked the 
                                                 
9 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, icty.org/. 
10 Carl Bildt, Peace Journey. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998, p. 57. 
11 Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force. Lancaster, UK: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 
1999, p. 145. Emphasis added. 
12 Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, pp. 32-33. 
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later Serb assault on the town in 1995. In making these claims, Serbs are seeking to deflect 
attention from the atrocious behavior of their own forces. But the claims nevertheless contain a 
kernel of truth, according to General Philippe Morillon, who commanded UN peacekeepers in 
Bosnia: “Orić engaged in attacks during Orthodox holidays and destroyed [Serb] villages, 
massacring all the inhabitants. This created a degree of hatred that was quite extraordinary in the 
[Srebrenica] region... [Orić] reigned by terror... he could not allow himself to take prisoners. 
According to my recollections he didn’t even look for an excuse. It was simply a statement: One 
can’t be bothered with prisoners.”13 Morillon’s statements cannot be lightly dismissed, given his 
high profile background and also given that he made these statements as a Prosecution witness at 
the ICTY’s Milošević trial. The court readily accepted his allegations, without dispute. 
While the Serb forces behaved worse than any other group in Bosnia, none of the armies 
displayed any special nobility. Retrospective efforts to elevate the Muslim government, and 
President Izetbegović in particular, are misleading whitewash. The whitewash played an 
important role in establishing the Srebrenica massacre as a morally simple affair, with villains 
and heroes; this moral simplicity helped justify military intervention in Bosnia, and also to 
portray military intervention more generally as benevolent.   
 
Srebrenica and the Redefinition of Genocide 
 
These perpetual references to the Holocaust [with regard to the Yugoslav wars] are a way 
of muzzling all discussion. Talking forbidden! Argument over! 
    -Claude Lanzmann, director of the documentary film, Shoah14 
 
The Srebrenica massacre was surely a horrific act, but did it constitute genocide? In 2003, 
the ICTY concluded that the massacre did qualify as a case of genocide, and General Krstić was 
later convicted of supporting genocide. US and NATO officials enthusiastically endorsed the 
idea of a Srebrenica genocide. Thus British diplomat Peter Wilson stated “Genocide occurred at 
Srebrenica. This is a legal fact,” while US Ambassador Samantha Power tweeted “Genocide is 
proven fact in Srebrenica.”15 The implication is that no reasonable person could possibly 
disagree. 
In reality, the idea of a Srebrenica genocide has elicited substantial disagreement among 
academic authorities; there is no consensus. William Schabas, past president of the International 
Association of Genocide Scholars criticized the ICTY ruling on Srebrenica: “it would have been 
more consistent and coherent to conclude that Srebrenica too was not an act of genocide.”16 The 
“genocide” characterization of Srebrenica and the Balkan wars more generally has been 
criticized in extended analyses in the Slavic Review and Yale Human Rights & Development Law 
                                                 
13 General Philippe Morillon, Prosecution witness, Milošević trial, ICTY, February 12, 2004, pp. 31965, 31966, 
icty.org. 
14 Claude Lanzmann quoted in Tariq Ali, “Introduction: After the War,” in Ali, ed., Masters of the Universe? 
NATO’s Balkan Crusade. London: Verso, 2000, pp. xv-xvi. 
15 Peter Wilson quoted in “Russia Vetoes UN Genocide Resolution on Srebrenica,” Aljazeera, July 9, 2015, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/russia-vetoes-genocide-resolution-srebrenica-150708150057291.html; 
Samantha Power, Twitter account, July 8, 2015, https://twitter.com/ambassadorpower/status/618807874656051200. 
16 In stating this, Schabas also emphasizes “the horror of the Srebrenica massacre.” Quotes from William A. 
Schabas, War Crimes and Human Rights: Essays on the Death Penalty, Justice, and Accountability. London: 
Cameron May, 2008, pp. 847-48.  
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Journal, and also in public statements by Ian Buruma and Claude Lanzmann.17 Note that none of 
these critiques challenge the horrific facts of the Srebrenica massacre, which are well 
established. The question is whether this massacre constituted genocide.  
The evocation of genocide inevitably draws comparisons between Serb atrocities in the 
1990s and Nazi atrocities against Jews during World War II. But such a comparison elides the 
fundamental differences between the two cases: The number of Jews killed in the Holocaust was 
6,000,000, while the total killed in World War II was upwards of 50,000,000; in Bosnia the total 
number killed on all sides – civilian and military – was 100,000. In most countries under Axis 
control during the Holocaust, the majority of Jews were killed; in Bosnia, the Muslim deaths 
constituted a relatively small percentage of their overall population. In the Nazi-run 
concentration camps, men, women, and children were murdered indiscriminately; in the 
Srebrenica massacre, the vast majority of victims were males sixteen or older.18 
In fact, the ICTY ruling on Srebrenica has led to a fundamental redefinition of genocide. 
Up until 1990, the word was used almost exclusively to describe deliberate mass killings of 
exceptional size and scale, generally in the range of the hundreds of thousands or millions. 
Genocide – the “crime of crimes” – was separated out from more common forms of atrocities. 
The term was rarely applied: Millions died in the Korean and Vietnamese wars, for example, 
with huge loss of civilian life, but without the word genocide being invoked to any significant 
extent. Hundreds of thousands were killed in civil conflicts in Algeria, Indonesia, and Nigeria, 
but again with no widespread claims of genocide.  
Recent discussions of the Srebrenica massacre and the Yugoslav wars more generally risk 
trivializing the concept of genocide. Thus Mirsad Tokača of the Sarajevo Research and 
Documentation Centre has proposed that “genocide is not a matter of numbers,”19 with the 
implication that any number of deliberate killings could potentially constitute genocide. Some 
have proposed that even nonfatal crimes, such as ethnic cleansing, should be classed as genocide: 
An article in Human Rights Review states that ethnic cleansing had become a “1990s synonym 
for genocide.”20 The problem here is simple: If we take these claims seriously, then we must 
reclassify virtually all ethnic wars as genocidal, since they almost always entail ethnically 
motivated killings and cleansings.  
And the extraordinary focus given to the Srebrenica massacre and the Bosnian war seems 
odd, given the plethora of conflicts that occurred during the same period. If we accept the Bosnia 
case as constituting genocide, then should we reclassify recent conflicts in Angola, Congo, 
Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Libya, Iraq, Colombia, and numerous others as genocides too? Should 
we reclassify all wars as genocides? There is a real danger that the word is being stretched, and 
will gradually lose meaning. It was in Bosnia and Srebrenica that this gradual loss of meaning 
                                                 
17 Robert M. Hayden, “’Genocide Denial’ Laws as Secular Heresy: A Critical Analysis with Reference to Bosnia,” 
Slavic Review 67, no. 2, 2008; Katherine G. Southwick, “Srebrenica as Genocide? The Krstić Decision and the 
Language of the Unspeakable,” Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 8, 2005; Ian Buruma, “Muddying 
the Meaning of Genocide,” Globe and Mail, May 31, 2011. The Lanzmann quote is cited above. 
18 Some 90 percent of the victims at Srebrenica were males sixteen or older, according to demographic researchers 
associated with the Prosecution at the Hague criminal tribunal, as cited in Robert M. Hayden, “Mass Killings and 
Images of Genocide in Bosnia, 1941-5 and 1992-5,” in Dan Stone, ed., The Historiography of Genocide. London: 
Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008, pp. 502-03. 
19 Interview with Mirsad Tokača in “Genocide is not a Matter of Numbers,” Bosnia Report, December-March 2006, 
www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report_format.cfm?articleid=3055&reportid=170.  
20 Peter Ronayne, “Genocide in Kosovo,” Human Rights Review 5, no. 4, 2004, p. 61.  
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began. These complexities aside, the redefinition of genocide was certainly useful to US 
policymakers, who possessed a new justification for intervention.  
 
The Role of Public Relations 
 
Public relations played a key role in conditioning world opinion about the issue of 
genocide, and this conditioning began from the very beginning of the Bosnian war. At the outset, 
it should be emphasized that public relations was unnecessary: If one wished to condemn Serb-
led armies, all one needed was to show what the Serbs were actually doing in Bosnia, which was 
indeed atrocious. The reality was damning and there was no need to exaggerate anything. 
Despite this fact, there was plenty of exaggeration – and it was used to propagate the idea that 
Serb atrocities were not merely horrific, but that these atrocities were on the same moral level as 
the Holocaust; and that the overall Bosnian war amounted to a localized replay of World War II. 
The idea that genocide was occurring seems to have originated with the issue of Serb-run 
detention centers in Bosnia, which housed Muslim and Croat prisoners, where major atrocities 
and abuses undoubtedly occurred. Beginning in 1992, the Bosnian government promoted the 
idea that these detention centers were Nazi-style extermination camps, similar to Auschwitz or 
Treblinka. New York’s Newsday helped publicize the idea of Serb extermination camps. In 
reality, the detention camp atrocities had been deliberately exaggerated by the Bosnian 
government, and President Izetbegović confessed this exaggeration shortly before his death, in a 
2003 interview with former French official Bernard Kouchner. This confession was later 
reported in Kouchner’s memoirs: 
 
Kouchner: You claimed the existence in Bosnia of “extermination camps.” You repeated 
this journalists… [Kouchner then notes he visited one of the main camps.] Conditions 
there were terrible but there was no systematic extermination. Did you know this? 
Izetbegović: Yes, I thought the claims would help trigger a bombing campaign by the 
Western powers… I tried but my claims were false. There were no extermination camps 
in Bosnia, even though conditions were terrible.21 
 
This confession by Izetbegović raises a disturbing possibility: The whole idea that Serb atrocities 
constituted genocide may well have resulted from a cynical public relations campaign. 
The Bosnian government claims were magnified by professional lobbyists, who worked 
as agents of Bosnia, as described in the National Journal: “The Croatians and the Bosnians who 
have hired the high powered Ruder-Finn Inc PR firm have out-organized and out-gunned the 
Serbs, who are making do with a small nonprofit PR operation in Chicago. The Croats and 
Bosnians have not only won this round, but they have also apparently acquired a powerful 
lobbying ally by winning the support of major Jewish organizations.”22 Three major Jewish 
organizations, no doubt with the best of intentions, organized rallies for Bosnia. 
Journalists and intellectuals found the Bosnia issue irresistible, and they openly 
campaigned for NATO military intervention, in favor of the Muslims and against the Serbs. In 
doing so, they dispensed with traditional notions of objectivity and neutrality. Thus Ed Vulliamy, 
who covered Bosnia for the Guardian, declared that journalistic neutrality was “both dangerous 
                                                 
21 Bernard Kouchner, Guerriers de la Paix (Paris: Grasset, 2004), pp. 374-75. Translated from the French, emphasis 
added. Note that Kouchner was a supporter of Izetbegović, and also of humanitarian intervention. 
22 Rochelle Stanfield, “Balkan Wars on K Street,” National Journal, August 15, 1992.  
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and morally reprehensible.” Similarly, Christianne Amanpour stated that with Bosnia, “it was not 
possible for a human being to be neutral.”23 Some writers disparaged logical assessment and 
insisted instead on emotionalism, a stance that was nicely distilled in Samantha Power’s best-
selling “A Problem from Hell”, which focused heavily on Bosnia. Power celebrated the 
“screamers” and those who “turned the daily press accounts into vibrant cries.”24 Journalists thus 
politicized their reporting. In this context, it became difficult to view the Bosnia case for what it 
was: a medium-sized civil war, not fundamentally different from numerous other conflicts of the 
post-1945 period. 
There was a campaign of denunciation against writers who opposed such tendentious 
accounts, and some of these were highly charged. This denunciation campaign began during the 
Bosnia war and has continued to the present day, now playing out in the unaccountable arena of 
the Internet. Readers who search the Balkan conflict will encounter a series of attacks, with an 
unpleasant tone, against a large number of academics and public figures who have commented 
on the Balkan conflict – including this author.25 With regard to Professor Schabas, noted above, 
one Internet posting is entitled: “Professor William Schabas is a Racist Denier of Genocide.”26 
While most of the attacks are anonymous, they often appear in mainstream newspapers27 and 
academic publications.28 In normal situations one might expect robust debate on the merits of 
NATO intervention or the ICTY’s use (possibly misuse) of the concept of genocide. But such 
debates have been artificially stifled by the pervasive use of ad hominem attacks and the 
resulting climate of fear generated by such attacks.  
The idea that genocide was occurring in Bosnia was thus established early on, well before 
the Srebrenica massacre. Once it was implanted in the public mind that the Serbs were 
committing not just mass murder and ethnic cleansing – which the Serbs were doing – but 
genocide, it became difficult to oppose intervention. The campaign for intervention became a 
moral crusade, immune to criticism. After the Srebrenica massacre occurred in 1995, it quickly 
resolved into a galvanizing event, which seemed to validate previous claims that genocide had 
been occurring all along.  
Added to this equation was the US foreign policy establishment, which was seeking some 
function for itself after the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the familiar Soviet enemy. 
An especially important objective was to find a new role for the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, which was the major instrument of US power in Europe.29 Longstanding members 
of the establishment, including such Cold Warriors as Max Kampelman, Paul Nitze, and Jeanne 
                                                 
23 Ed Vulliamy, “‘Neutrality’ and the Absence of Reckoning: A Journalist’s Account,” Journal of International 
Affairs 52, no. 2, 1999, p. 604; Amanpour quoted in Sherry Ricchiardi, “Over the Line? Journalists as Advocates in 
the Bosnian war,” American Journalism Review, September 1996. 
24 Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America in the Age of Genocide. Harper-Collins, 2003, p. 515. 
25 See David N. Gibbs, “Welcome to the Balkan Propaganda Machine,” Antiwar.com, June 11, 2012, 
http://original.antiwar.com/david-gibbs/2012/06/10/welcome-to-the-balkan-propaganda-machine/. 
26 “Professor William Schabas is a Racist Denier of Genocide,” anonymous posting, no date, 
https://professorwilliamschabas.wordpress.com/. The Internet contains numerous attack postings just like this one.  
27 An attack on Noam Chomsky’s Bosnia views in the Guardian contained so much false information that the 
newspaper editors were forced to retract the story and apologize. See “Corrections and Clarifications: The Guardian 
and Chomsky,” Guardian online, November 17, 2005, 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2005/nov/17/pressandpublishing.corrections. 
28 Regarding the use of ad hominem attacks by academic writers, see the useful discussion in Robert M. Hayden, 
“Moralizing about Scholarship about Yugoslavia,” East European Politics & Societies 21, no. 1, 2007. 
29 US-European tensions during this period are well described in James Petras and Steven Vieux, “Bosnia and the 
Revival of US Hegemony,” New Left Review, no. 218, 1996.   
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Kirkpatrick, advocated military action in the Balkans, against the Serbs.30 The US Air Force, 
eager to prove its capabilities and to justify its post-Cold War budget, advocated air strikes.31 In 
the private sector, the weapons producing companies too needed justification for their continued 
procurements, and they stood to benefit from any interventions that took place. Within the 
Clinton administration, however, there was initially some trepidation about military action, 
which presented the possibility of a Vietnam-style quagmire. This trepidation was gradually 
overcome, and the administration began preparing for military intervention in 1994.32 The details 
of this intervention we will discuss shortly. For now I will note that the full weight of US power 
and prestige entered the fray, and publicized the idea of a Serb-directed genocide, which helped 
to justify the overall policy of intervention. Consistent with this strategy, the United States and 
its NATO allies played key roles in supporting the ICTY tribunal in The Hague. In 1999, a 
NATO spokesman stated that “Without NATO countries, there would be no… International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.” The spokesman added that NATO states funded 
the tribunal and supported “on a daily basis their activities.”33  
The ICTY is often viewed as an independent judicial body, free from external political 
influences. The longtime president of the court, Theodor Meron (who presided over the ICTY 
decision that defined the Srebrenica massacre as an act of genocide) has been viewed with 
special admiration. Recent releases from the WikiLeaks organization cast doubt on these 
sanguine views. A State Department document refers to Meron as “the preeminent supporter of 
USG [US government] efforts” – hardly the characterization of an impartial judge.34 At one 
point, Meron contacted US embassy personnel in the Netherlands and lobbied them to help block 
renewal of a prosecutor that Meron did not favor – which constitutes questionable conduct for a 
judicial figure.35 To be clear: There is no doubt that horrific crimes had been committed during 
the Balkan wars, and the perpetrators of these crimes deserved trial before an impartial court.  
However, the WikiLeaks documents raise doubts about the actual conduct of the ICTY, and 
whether its personnel acted as agents of impartial justice or realpolitik.  
In his classic study, E. H. Carr argued that what passes for morality in international 
relations is often defined by the hegemonic powers of the era, consistent with their perceived 
national interests.36 In the 1990s, a hegemonic United States helped redefine the concept of 
genocide, and did so in a manner that clearly served American interests. Ultimately US power 
                                                 
30 Daniel Williams, “Ex-Statesman Urge Strikes against Serbs,” Washington Post, September 2, 1993; and Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick, “Failure of Collective Security,” Baltimore Sun, November 30, 1993. 
31 Regarding the US Air Force role in policy debates, see David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, 
and the Generals. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, pp. 40-41; and George Kenney and Michael J. Dugan, 
“Operation Balkan Storm: Here’s a Plan,” New York Times, November 29, 1992. 
32 Cees Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia. Münster: Lit, 2002, chap. 4. 
33 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Press Conference Given by NATO Spokesman, Jamie Shea and SHAPE 
Spokesman, Major General Walter Jertz,” May 17, 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990517b.htm. Note that 
the quoted spokesman was speaking of both the ICTY and the International Court of Justice. 
34 US Department of State, “ICTY: Ambassador Prosper’s Meeting ICTY President and Registrar,” Message from 
US Embassy, The Hague, July 11, 2003, WikiLeaks Archive, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/. For additional evidence of 
ICTY deference to US interests, see Timothy William Waters, “Unexploded Bomb: Voice, Silence, and 
Consequence at the Hague Tribunals – A Legal and Rhetorical Critique,” NYU Journal of International Law and 
Politics 35, no. 4, 2003. 
35 US Department of State, “ICTY: President Meron Urges USG to Oppose Del Ponte Renewal,” Message from US 
Embassy, The Hague, July 17, 2003, WikiLeaks Archive, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/. The document gives no 
indication as to whether US officials took action to block renewal of the disliked prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte. 
36 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. New 
York: Harper & Row, 1964.  
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was probably more influential in the redefinition of genocide than all the activism by the various 
lobbyists, journalists, and humanitarians, who created the idea in the first place. The ICTY’s 
2003 determination that genocide occurred in the Krstić case was certainly helpful to US 
hegemony: The ICTY verdict served to recast recent US military actions – in the Balkans and 
elsewhere – as benevolent acts of genocide prevention. The new emphasis on genocide silenced 
potential critics of intervention, which was beneficial to policymakers, who were protected from 
criticism. 37 More than any other factor, it was the Bosnian conflict that established this pro-
interventionist climate – really a pro-war climate – that persists to the present. 
Amidst all the sanctimony, it was forgotten that Bosnia was one of many post-Cold War 
conflicts, and it was very far from being the most deadly (the Congo probably has that 
unfortunate distinction38). Nevertheless, the widespread belief that the Serbs had committed 
genocide played a critical role in legitimating the idea of humanitarian intervention.  
 
Could the Massacre Have been Prevented? 
 
The anti-Nazi narrative that emerged from the Srebrenica episode has another 
implication, which is to denigrate diplomatic means of resolving crises. Thus, it is frequently 
claimed that international efforts at mediating the Bosnia conflict amounted to appeasement of 
Serb aggression, similar to the earlier appeasement of Nazi aggression, which enabled the Serbs’ 
genocidal campaign and ultimately the Srebrenica massacre. Diplomats who participated in the 
mediation efforts were widely denounced as modern day incarnations of Neville Chamberlain. In 
1993, Anthony Lewis of the New York Times condemned “a policy of appeasement, a wheedling 
diplomacy that rewarded Serbian aggression.”39 Clearly, this “wheedling diplomacy” was not 
viewed positively.   
In reality, the conventional wisdom is wrong, as diplomatic efforts probably could have 
prevented the conflict from occurring in the first place, which would have made the later 
intervention unnecessary. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the Bosnia conflict began in early 1992, 
shortly before the war actually began. This effort was directed by Portuguese diplomat José 
Cutileiro, who represented the European Community. Cutileiro successfully brought together the 
leaders of all three ethnic groups from Bosnia, the Muslims, the Serbs, and the Croats, where he 
sought to establish an agreement to defuse ethnic tensions and thus preclude civil war. The peace 
talks established a plan to divide Bosnia into three semi-autonomous regions, as parts of what 
was to become an ethnic confederation, though still an integral state. All three ethnic groups 
agreed to a preliminary version of the peace plan on March 17, since the plan, whatever its flaws, 
was presumed better than the alternative, which was war. Crucially, Serb leaders also supported 
                                                 
37 During the run-up to the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, personalized attacks were widely used. Juan Cole for 
instance wrote of the “Woolly thinking, outrageous lies, moon-eyed Gaddafi-worship” and other sins, which he 
attributed to the antiwar movement. Previously, in 2002, Michael Walzer proposed a “decent left,” which would 
support US intervention in Afghanistan and elsewhere, in contrast to a presumably indecent left, which was opposed 
to intervention. The article associated anti-interventionism with indecency. Such attacks on the moral characters of 
anti-interventionists were useful in deflecting attention from substantive issues regarding the actual merits of 
military action. See Cole, “Berubé on Libya and the Left,” Informed Comment, November 5, 2011, 
http://www.juancole.com/2011/11/berube-on-libya-and-the-left.html; Walzer, “Can There Be a Decent Left?” 
Dissent, Summer, 2002. 
38 The Congolese war of 1998-2004 caused some 4 million deaths, vastly more than Bosnia, but with surprisingly 
little attention. See Benjamin Coghlan et al, “Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Nationwide 
Survey,” The Lancet 367, no. 9504, 2006. 
39 Anthony Lewis, “When You Appease Fascism,” New York Times, December 17, 1993. 
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the Cutileiro plan. Though many details remained to be worked out, the Cutlieiro plan presented 
the possibility of a peaceful resolution for Bosnia.40 
The problem emerged when the United States asserted its influence. American officials 
expressed jealousy at the idea that European states might resolve the conflict, which would 
weaken US prestige and raise questions about the value of the Atlantic Alliance. There was a 
special fear that the European Community might emerge as a distinct power bloc in the post-
Soviet world, acting independently of the United States and NATO. Any EC success in Bosnia 
would increase the likelihood of an independent Europe – and this prospect was viewed dimly in 
Washington.41  
US officials thus acted to wreck the Cutileiro plan. The US ambassador to Yugoslavia, 
Warren Zimmermann, encouraged President Izetbegović to reject the peace plan. A New York 
Times article noted, “Immediately after Mr. Izetbegović returned from Lisbon, Mr. Zimmermann 
called on him… ‘[Izetbegović] said he didn’t like [the Cutileiro plan],’ Mr. Zimmermann 
recalled. ‘I told him if he didn’t like it, why sign it?”42 According to former State Department 
official George Kenney, “Zimmermann told Izetbegović … [the United States will] recognize 
you and help you out. So don’t go ahead with the [Cutileiro plan].”43  
Ambassador Zimmermann publicly denied blocking the Cutileiro plan, but there is 
considerable evidence that he did block it. That Zimmermann and the US government more 
generally sought to undermine the plan has been confirmed by James Bissett, the Canadian 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia; Peter Carrington, a former UK foreign minister; and the official 
Dutch investigation of the Bosnian war; as well as Kenny of the State Department (cited 
above).44 With regard to the failed peace deal, Cutileiro later claimed: “Izetbegović and his aides 
were encouraged to scupper that deal by well meaning outsiders”45 – very likely a 
diplomatically-worded reference to Zimmermann’s meddling. In light of this US pressure, the 
Croats and Muslims both withdrew from the agreement – effectively reneging on their previous 
commitments – during March 25-26, 1992. The stage was set for war.  
There is a widespread view that international mediation efforts never had a chance to 
succeed, given the Serbs’ aggressiveness. What this ignores is that all three ethnic groups 
initially endorsed the peace plan; the Serbs enthusiastically supported it (Serb leader Radovan 
Karadžić called the agreement on the Cutileiro plan “a great day for Bosnia and Herzegovina”46). 
The interventionists also ignore the US role in sabotaging the peace negotiations.47 
                                                 
40 For a description of this plan see Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Srebrenica – A ‘Safe’Area, 2003, 
Part I, Chapter 5, Section 3, niod.knaw.nl/en/srebrenica-report/report. 
41 Discussed in Petras and Vieux, “Bosnia and the Revival of US Hegemony.”   
42  Quoted in David Binder, “US Policymakers on Bosnia Admit Errors in Opposing Partition in 1992,” New York 
Times, August 29, 1993. 
43 George Kenney interviewed in the documentary film “Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War,” 2002, directed by 
George Bogdanich.   
44 Peter Carrington interviewed in “Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War”; James Bissett, “Balkan War,” section on 
Bosnia, no date, www.deltax.net/bissett/western/bosnia.htm; Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, 
Srebrenica – A ‘Safe’ Area, Part I, Chapter 5, Section 3, niod.knaw.nl/en/srebrenica-report/report. Regarding 
Zimmermann’s denial, see his letter to the editor, “Bosnian About-Face,” New York Times, September 30, 1993. 
45 José Cutilero, “Pre-War Bosnia,” letter to the editor, Economist, December 9, 1995. He made these comments 
with regard to both the initial agreement and also subsequent efforts to revive the agreement.  
46 Quote from Binder, “US Policymakers on Bosnia Admit Errors.” 
47 There is a tendency to whitewash these events. Thus Robert Donia provides extended discussion of Cutileiro’s 
mediation efforts, but he omits any mention of the US efforts to sabotage the mediation. Similarly, Josip Glaurdic’s 
principal reference to the US sabotage is the following: “Whether Izetbegović made his decision [to withdraw from 
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The Cutileiro plan was never implemented, and war commenced almost immediately. 
During the following three years, the European Community/Union often worked together with 
the United Nations to revive the idea of an ethnic confederation, somewhat similar to the one 
previously presented at by Cutileiro, as a basis for ending the war. Most of these efforts were 
directed by David Owen, a former British foreign minister who became the EC/EU appointed 
mediator for the Balkans. In his memoirs, Owen emphasized the US role in impeding his 
negotiation efforts, and thus prolonging the Bosnian war.48 
The idea that international diplomacy proved ineffectual is a myth; it is one of the most 
dangerous myths that has emerged from the Bosnian war – and also one that has helped to justify 
later efforts to scuttle diplomatic settlements in Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya.49 With regard to the 
ongoing civil war in Syria, new evidence has come to light that the United States was 
instrumental in scuttling a proposed settlement for that conflict too50 – with horrible 
consequences. One of the main legacies of the Srebrenica massacre is the widespread notion that 
military force rather than negotiation must be the principal means of resolving ethnic conflicts.  
 
Humanitarian Intervention after the Srebrenica Massacre 
 
The United States and its allies opted for a military strategy, beginning in August 1995. A 
key component of the offensive plans involved the Republic of Croatia, which was expected to 
assist the Bosnian government in defeating the Serbs. The operation commenced with a Croatian 
attack against separatist Serbs within the Republic of Croatia, in the Krajina region, near the 
border with Bosnia. The Croatian military quickly defeated the Serbs and crossed into western 
Bosnia, where they linked up with Bosnian government forces for a joint offensive against ethnic 
Serbs within Bosnia. During the period August through October 1995, the combined Bosnian-
Croatian thrust was highly successful in defeating Serb forces, and rolling back their gains from 
earlier phases of the war. These offensives were strongly supported by the US government,51 
which had been assisting both the Croatian and Bosnian government forces in their military 
preparations since 1994. In addition, the US and other NATO states undertook a two-week 
bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs to assist the ground offensive.  Following the 
combined military actions, the United States organized peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, which 
produced the Dayton Accords of December 1995, ending the war in Bosnia (and also in Croatia).  
                                                                                                                                                             
the agreement] under the influence of the Americans remains unclear,” as if this were a minor matter; Glaurdic 
omits most evidence to the contrary. Donia, Radovan Karadžić: Architect of the Bosnian Genocide. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 150-56, 175-76; Glaurdic, The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the 
Breakup of Yugoslavia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012, p. 295. In fairness, I note that Donia and 
Glaurdic have been critical of my work on Yugoslavia. 
48 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey. Orlando, FL: Harcourt-Brace, 1995, pp. 400-01. 
49 Regarding the scuttling of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Kosovo crisis, see Gibbs, “The Principle of ‘First Do 
No Harm,’” in Roger MacGinty and Jenny H. Peterson, eds., Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action. 
London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 112-114. On Libya, see Hugh Roberts, “Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go?” London 
Review of Books, November 17, 2011; and Alan J. Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing 
NATO’s Libya Campaign,” International Security 38, no. 1, 2013, p. 115. The Bush administration’s efforts to 
undermine diplomatic efforts with regard to Iraq have been widely reported.  
50 Julian Borger and Bastien Inzaurralde, “West ‘Ignored Russian Offer in 2012 to have Syria’s Assad Step Aside,’” 
Guardian, September 15, 2015. 
51 On US support for the offensives, see Bill Clinton, My Life. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 667; “Bill Clinton 
Cherche à Reprendre l’Initiative à propos de l’ex-Yougoslavie,” Le Monde, August 12, 1995; and Richard 
Holbrooke, To End a War. New York: Random House, 1998, pp. 86, 160. 
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These military operations produced a humanitarian disaster. The offensives in Croatia 
and Bosnia generated at least 250,000 refugees, many of whom were Serb civilians who had 
lived in the Krajina long before the war had begun. The expelled persons also included large 
numbers of ethnic Muslims from the Bihać region of Bosnia, who were opposed to the 
Izetbegović government and were therefore suspect. In addition to this mass expulsion, the 
combined offensives killed hundreds of civilians (or possibly thousands of civilians, according to 
Jane’s correspondent Tim Ripley).52 
These episodes of ethnic cleansing were substantially smaller than the cumulated rounds 
of cleansings that had been perpetrated by the Serbs during the years of war, in both Croatia and 
Bosnia. These facts notwithstanding, the anti-Serb atrocities that attended the August-October 
1995 offensives were substantial all the same. In the Krajina alone, Croatian attacks generated 
“the largest single movement of refugees in Europe since the Soviet Union crushed the 
Hungarian uprising in 1956,” according to a Red Cross official, as paraphrased in the New York 
Times.53 The cleansing of Serbs had been planned long in advance, at the highest level. As early 
as 1993, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman stated in an official meeting, “there is a growing 
understanding that Croatia must resolve the [Krajina] problem by war, contrary to international 
norms, meaning by ethnically cleansing the Serbs from Croatia.”54  
It is true that the military offensives led to the Dayton Accords, which ended the war, but 
this achievement seems less impressive under scrutiny. In reality, the Dayton Accords were not a 
great deal different from the Cutileiro agreement of 1992, which the US helped to sabotage, and 
several other peace plans that were presented during the course of the war. And then in early 
1996, shortly after the implementation of the Dayton Accords, there was another round of anti-
Serb ethnic cleansing, which generated an additional 100,000 refugees.55 The main effect of the 
NATO intervention was to escalate the ongoing atrocities against civilians, and to intensify the 
humanitarian catastrophe.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, the US policy response to the Srebrenica massacre was a failure, when viewed 
from a humanitarian standpoint. It worsened the crisis it was supposed to resolve, and helped 
pave the way for future interventionist failures as well. Facts aside, a mythology has emerged 
from the Srebrenica affair, which emphasizes the supposedly benign character of US 
intervention. In general, US policy was held to be the savior of the Bosnian people and the 
defender of oppressed peoples more generally. NATO interventions following Srebrenica 
established a post-Cold War relevance for both the Atlantic Alliance and US hegemony; while 
the new language of human rights and genocide prevention – closely associated with Srebrenica 
– helped legitimate later interventions, including the on-going Western strikes against ISIS. 
Srebrenica has truly redefined the character of US hegemony for the post-Cold War era. It helped 
                                                 
52 Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, p. 316. 
53 Jane Perlez, “Croatian Serbs Blame Belgrade for their Rout,” New York Times, August 11, 1995. Power provides 
very extensive discussion of the Balkan wars, but her only mention of the Krajina ethnic cleansing is a statement 
that Croatia’s army was “expelling members of its Serb minority” in 1995 – six words. Power, “A Problem from 
Hell”, p. 438. 
54 Transcript of Croatian government meeting reprinted verbatim in “Planning Croatia’s Final Solution,” Harper’s, 
December 2001. Emphasis added. 
55 Bildt, Peace Journey, p. 196. 
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forge a pro-interventionist alliance of both militarist liberals and neoconservatives, and this 
alliance remains a potent lobby for war to the present day.  
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